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[L. A. No. 19887. In Bank. May 3, 1948.]

WARNER BROS. PICTURES, INC. (a Corporation),
Appellant, T. JOAN BRODEL et aI., Respondents.
[1] Infants-Oontracts-D1saflirmance.-Civ. Code, § 36, declariDg

that "a minor cannot disaffirm a contract" approved by the
court does not permit the minor to disaflirm the contract during
the second period referred to in § 35, namely, within a. reasonable time after majority, since § 35 grants the right of
disaffirmance before or after majority only in cases "other
than those specified in section thirty-six and thirty-sevcn,"
and since it speaks of disaffirmance after majority as disaffirmance ''by the minor," and thus· specifies the status of
the person when he made the contract, not his status when '
he disaffirms it.
[1] See 14 Oa1.Jur. 124; 27 Am.Jur. 771.
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2, 10-12, 14] Infants, § 10;
[3-S) Contracts, 117; (9) Injunctions, §21; [13] Master and
Servant, 127; [15] Appeal and Error, § 967.
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[2] Id.-Contracts-Disaftirmance.-Disaf'firmance of a contraet,
executed or executory, whether declared before or after
majority has the effcct of a rescission.
[3] Contracts-Consent-Option.-An option agreement is a contract distinct from the contract to which the option Telates,
since it does not bind the optionee to perform or to enter into
tbe contract on the terms specified in the option.
[4] Id.-Oonsent-Option.-An option contract, in which the 0ptionor stipulates that for a specified or reasonable period
he waives the right to revoke the offer, is different from the
contract to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor relates, for the optionee by parting with special consideration
for the binding promise of the optionor refrains from binding
himself with regard to the contract or conveyance to which
the option rclates.
[5] Id.-Consent-Option.-While an optionee incurs no liability
with regard to the contract or conveyance as to which he
holds an option, the optionor has irrevocably promised npon
the exercise of the option to perform the contract or make the
conveyance on the terms specified in his binding offer, and
the creation of the final contract requires no promise or other
action by the optionor because the contract is completed by
the acceptance of the offer by the optionee.
[6] Id.-Consent-OptioD.-An option contract gives the optionee
a right agninst the optionor for performance of the contract
to which the option relates upon the exercise of the option,
which the optionor cannot defeat by repudiating the option.
[7] Id.-Consent-Option.~ince an optionor promises to perform the contract to which the option relates, subject to a
condition at the discretion of the optionee, an option contract
involves on the part of the optionor a unilateral promise to
perform the obligations of the contract to which the option
relates.
.
[8] Id.-Consent-OptioD.-The granting of an option for a contract of employment by a prospective employee to a prospective employer involves a binding promise of the optionor
to perform services upon specified terms and thus constitutes
on his part a contract to perform or render services.
[9] Injunctions-Contract Rights.-An employee can be enjoined
from performing extraordinary services to others during a
period for which his employment under a contract of employment has been extended by the exercise of an option of the
employer.
[10] Infants-Contracts-Disa1llrmance.-The fact· that the promise of a minor to render services in an option agreement is
[6] See 6 CaLJur. 27; 12 Am.Jur. 524.
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subject to the condition precedent that the option beexercised, does not make inapplicable Civ. Code, § 36, prohibiting
minors from disaffirming contracts for dramatic services ap.
proved by the court.
[11] Id.-Contracts-Disafllrmance.-Options giving an emploY1!r
the right to extend a minor motion picture actress' employ.
ment for a number of consecutive years at a progressivel;l'
higher salary, included in a contract providing for employment
of the minor for a year at a designated !!alary per week, can be
approved by the court as part of a contract of employment,
even if they are not in themselves contracts to pcrform
or render services within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 36,
prohibiting minors from disaffirming contracts for dramatic
services approved by the court.
[12] Id.-Contracts-Disafllrmance.-The provisions of Civ. Code,
§ 36, regarding the submission of contracts of minors for court
approval, are based on a policy different from the policy of
the law to discourage adults from contracting with infants,
which underlies the right of minors to disaffirm their CODtracts. The purpose of such provisions is to enable minors
entering upon a professional career to make contracts with
employers reasonably protecting the interests of both parties.
[13] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Duration.
-Lab. Code, § 2855, which prohibits the enforcement of
contracts for employment o~er a period of more than seven-'
years, applies to the term of employment of minors under
contracts specified in Civ. Code, § 36.
[14] Infants-Contracts-Disaffirmance.-Inasmuch as there are
reasonable grounds for the statutory provisions withdraWIng
the right of disaffirmance from minors with regard to eontracts to render services in the professions specified in Civ.
Code, § 36, if such contracts are found reasonable by a court
in a special proceeding for the examination thereof, the statute
does not violate constitutional rights of such a minor under
the equal protection of laws clause of the federal Constitution
or under the provisions of the state Constitution against special legislation.
[15] Appeal-Review-Pleadings--Judgment on Demurrer.-On
appeal from a judgment dismissing an action on sustaining a
general demurrer, the reviewing court is not concerned with
the type of relief to which plaintiff may be entitled.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge. Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief and for an injunction. J udgment for defendants on sustaining demurrers to complaint
without leave to awend, reversed.
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Freston & Files, Ralph E. Lewis and Gordon L. Files for
Appellant.
Oscar R. Cummins, Jennings & Belcher, Frank Belcher,
Max Radin, Aaron J. Blackman and Robert Kingsley for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-On March 27, 1942, plaintiff, a producer of
motion pictures, entered into a written agreement with defendant Brodel, then a minor seventeen years of age, wherein
the latter promised to perform dra:m.atic services exclusively
for plaintiff "for and during the term of the agreement."
The instrument provided that "the term of this contract"
should commence on March 30, 1942, and continue thereafter
for 52 weeks; that during this period defendant should receive a weekly salary of $600; and that "in consideration of
the terms and covenants of this agreement and of the consent
of the producer to the amount of compensation as herein set
forth" plaintiff should have six separate options to extend
the term of defendant's employment for additional successive
periods of 52 weeks each, at a progressively higher salary,
namely, $750, $1,000, $1,250, $1,750 and $2,250 per week.
Under section 36 of the Civil Code the agreement was submitted to the Superior Oourt of Los Angeles Oounty for approval, and on May 12, 1942, the court approved the agreement
and incorporated it in its order. This incorporation makes it
clear that the court approved the whole agreement including
the options.
When this order was made, the pertinent provisions of
section 36 read as follows: "A minor cannot disaffirm a contract, otherwise valid, to perform or render services as actor,
actress, or other dramatic services, as participant or player
in professional sports, including, but without being limited to,
professional boxers, professional wrestlers and professional
jockeys, where such contract has been approved by the superior court of the county where such minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be given on the petition of either
party to the contract after such reasonable notice to the
other party thereto, as may be fixed by said court, with opportunity to such other party to appear and be heard."
Defendl1Ilt performed her obligations under· the agreement
for the first 52 weeks, and, when plaintiff elected to exercise
the first three options, she continued to· perform for three
11 C.Jd-U
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additional periods of 52 weeks each. In January, 1946, Qe]:enICl~li
ant reached her majority. On February 13, 1946, Y'a,uu.,I,lf.l
gave notice to defendant of its election to exercise the
option. Defendant replied' by notifying plaintiff that
disaffirmed her agreement and would render no further
ices to plaiutiff. Immediately thereafter she entered into
agreement with the other defendants, also motion-picture
ducers, to perform dramatic services for them.
.
Basing its calise of action on the foregoing facts alleged ill .
its complaint together with the allegation that when the other
defendants entered into their contract with def611dant Brod~;
tbey were aware of her obligations toward plaintiff and con-;'
trived to circumvent plaintiff's rights, plaintiff brought this·
action for declaratory relief and for an injunction preventing
defendant Brodel from performing and the other defendants
from causing her to perform dramatic services for anyone.
except plaintiff. The trial court sustained demurrers inter- .'
posed by defendants, without leave to amend, and dismissed
the action. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff contends that the approval of the agreement by
the court deprived defendant Brodel of the right of dis-,
affirmance. Defendant contends that this approval deprived
her of the right of disaffirmance only during her minority
but did not preclude disaffirmance within a reasonable time
after she reached majority. Defendant contends also thatj
section 36 applies only to contracts of employment; that op-.
tions for a contract of employment are not contracts of employment; that therefore the court had no power to approve!
the option features of the agreement; and that the statute
cannot be applied to the present case without depriving defendant of her constitutional rights under the equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution and
the provisions against special laws in section 25 of article IV
of the California Constitution.
[1] Section 35 of the Civil Code provides: "In all cases \
other than those specified in sections thirty-six and thirtyseven,. the contract of a minor . . • may be disaffirmed by the
minor himself, either before his majority or within a reasonable time afterwards." Section 36 provides that I f a minor
cannot disaffirm a contract" approved by the court. Defendant contends that the use of the phrase "a minor cannot disaffirm" in section 36 (italics added) makes it clear that disaffirmance of a contract approved by the court is barred only
for the period of the minority of the party to the .contract

I
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and that the minor can disaffirm the contract during the
second period referred to in section 35, namely, within a
reasonable time after majority. This contention takes no
account of the fact that section 35 grants the right of disaffirmance before or after majority only in cases "other than
those specified in section thirty-six and thirty-seven," or of the
fact that it speaks of disaffirmance after majority as disaffirmance "by the minor," and thus specifies the status of the
person when he made the contract, not his status when he disaffirms it. There is no need to repeat in other sections of the
Civil Code the provisions in section 35 as to who may disaffirm and when disaffirmance may be declared; they are
part of the law of disaffirmance in that code and must therefore be read into other sections of the code relating to disaffirmance of contracts of a minor. Moreover, section 36 confers upon the superior courts the power by their approval of
contracts of minors to remove from the obligations incurred
therein the uncertainty that otherwise attends contract obligations of a minor because of his right of disaffirmance.
[2] Disaffirmance of a contract, executed or executory,
whether declared before or after majority has the e1iect of a
rescission. (Flittner v. Equitable Life .4ssur. Soc., 30 Cal.
App. 209, 216 {157 P. 630J; Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal.App.
158, 160 [285 P. 720) ; see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.),
§ 231.) If section 36 prohibited disaffirmance of a contract
approved by the court during minority only, but permitted
disaffirmance thereof after majority, it would not remove the
uncertainty attending the right of disaffirmance. If the section
merely postponed the exercise of the minor'8 right to disaffirm, it would thereby only prolong the uncertainty, since
a minor who intended to disaffirm the contract would have to
leave the matter in suspense until he reached majority.
Defendant's contention that a court has no power under
section 36 to approve an option such as the options in the
agreement between parties is based on the language of the
section providing for approval of a contract "to perform or
render services." Defendant contends that since an agreement granting an option is a contract to keep an offer open
and as such is distinct from the contract to which the option
relates, an option for a contract of employment is therefore
not itself a contract "to perform or render services." [3] It
is universally accepted that an option agreement is a contract
distinct from the contract to which the option relates, since
it does not bind the optionee to· perform or enter into the

)

\
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contract upon the terms specified in the option. It does
follow, however, that by entering into an option contract~;
whereby he irrevocably promises to render services to the
optionee upon the timely exercise of the option by the latter.,
an optionor does not enter into a contract "to perform
render services. "J~
[4] In an option contract the optionor stipulates that forjl
a specified or reasonable period he waives the right to reVOke
....
the offer. (Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal.2d 449, 452 [122 P.2d 8, 139
A.L.R. 1032] j Hicks v. Ohristeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716 [164 PI
395] ; Seeburg v. El Royale Oorp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128 1
P.2d 362) j Bruce v. Mieir, 120 Oal.App. 287, 290 [7 P.2d
1037] ; see Johnson v. Olark, 174 Cal. 582 [163 P.1004] j W. G.
Reese 00. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [124P. 442] j Tufts v. Mann;
116 Cal.App. 170, 178 [2 P.2d 500] ; Restatement, Contracts,'
§ 47.) Such a contract is clearly different from the contract
to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor relates, for the
optionee by parting with special consideration for the binding
promise of the optionor refrains from binding himself with
regard to the contract or conveyance to which the option
relates. An option contract relating to the sale of land is
therefore "by no means a sale of property, but is a sale of a
right to purchase" (Hicks v. Ohristeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716 [164
P. 395] j see Smith v. Bangham, 156 Cal. 359, 365 [104 P. 689,
28 L.R.A. N.S. 522]; Ware v. Quigley, 176 Cal. 694, 698 [169
P. 377] j Ludy v. Zumwalt, 85 Cal.App. 119, 130-131 [259 P.
52] j Alegretti v. Gardner, 74 Cal.App. 564, 566 [241 P. 408] ;
Howard v. Hobson 00., 38 Cal.App. 445, 455 [176 P. 715];
Jlenzel v. Primm, 6 Cal.App. 204, 209 [91 P. 754]), or, as
stated in Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 [23 N.W.2d
362, 363, 166 A.L.R. 435] : " . . . A contract conferring an
option to purchase is . . . an irrevocable and continuing offer .
to sell, and conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but
wsts in him only a right in personam to buy at his election."
[5] Nevertheless, while the optionee incurs no liability with reprd to the contract or conveyance as to which he holds an option, the optionor has irrevocably promised upon the exercise of
tile option to perform the contract or make the conveyance
vpon the terms specified in his binding offer. (Western Union
rel. 00. v. Brown, 253 U.S. 101, 110 [40 8.0t. 460, 64 L.Ed.
11)3] j Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 [23 N.W.2d 362,
.3, 166 A.L.R. 435] j Richanbach v. Ruby, 127 Ore. 612 [271
P. 600, 61 A.L.R. 1441] ; 12 Am.Jur. 524-525.) The optionee
.-arts with consideration only because the optionor bas in-

or;
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curred such liability. The creation of the final contract requires
no promise or other action by the optionor, for the contract is
completed by the acceptance of the irrevocable offer of th<l
optionor by the optionee. I ' The contract has already been
made, as far as the optionor is concerned, but is subject t(.
conditions which are removed by the acceptance." (Seeburg v.
El Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128 P.2d 362] ; see
Erickson v. Boothe, 79 Cal.App.2d 266, 272 [179 P.2d 611].)
[6] Thus the option contract gives the optionee a right against
the optionor for performance of the contract to which the option relates upon the ex.ercise of the option, which the optionor
cannot defeat by repudiating the option. (See McGovney,
Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 644, 646, 654, and cases
collected in footnote 5, p. 646; Corbin, Option Contracts, 23
Yale L.J. 641, 656.) [7] Since the optionor promises to
perform the contract to which the option relates, subject to
a condition at the discretion of the optionee, an option contract
involves on the part of the optionor a unilateral promise to
perform the obligations of the contract to which the option
relates. (Heller v. Pope, 250 N.Y. 132 [164 N.E. 881, 882] ;
Lake Shore Country Club v. Brand, 339 Ill. 504 [171 N.E.
494, 501] ; Robbs v. Illinois Rural etc. Corp., 313 Ill.App. 418
[40 N.E.2d 549, 551]; Schlein v. Gairoard, 127 N.J.L. 358
[22 A.2d 539, 540] ; Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141
[23 N.W.2d 362, 365, 166 A.L.R. 435]; Zora Realty Co. v.
Gf'een, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445; see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev.
ed.), pp.175-176; Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 Yale L.J. 641,
650; Restatement, Contracts, § 12.) [8] It follows that even
though the option agreement differs from the contract of employment the granting of an option for a contract of employment by a prospective employee to a prospective employer involves a binding promise of the optionor to perform services
upon specified terms and thus constitutes on his part a contract "to perform or render services. "
[9] The rule of equity that under a contract calling for exceptional services an employer can enjoin his employee from
rendering such services to others, has been held applicable
to options, since "an option, when based on a sufficient consideration, is a contract by which one binds himself to . . •
perform services," and an employee can therefore be enjoined
from performing extraordinary services to others during a
period for which his employment uuder a contract of employment has been extended by the exercise of an option of the

I
\
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employer. (Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827, ssi
[20 A.L.R. 846] ; see Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 PL
210 [51 A. 973, 90 Am.St.Rep. 627, 58 L.R.A. 227].)
"::~i;
[10] The fact that the promise of the minor to render
services in an option agreement is subject to the condition"
precedent that the option be exercised does not make section:
36 inapplicable. Nothing in that section indicates that a con.,
tract to render services must be unconditional to be approved"
by the court under that section. Thus a court could approve
a contract of a minor actor to perform dramatic services made
subject to the condition that a certain motion picture in' the
planning stage shall" be produced; or that a certain play shall
be performed; or that another actor shall not participate in a
performance. There is no difference between contracts of a:
minor making the rendering of his services dependent upon
such conditions, and an option contract making the rendering
of his services dependent upon the exercise of the option by
the other party.
[11] The options granted to plaintiff by defendant were
included in a contract providing for employment of the minor
for a period of 52 weeks at a salary of $600 per week. Even
if they were not in themselves contracts to perform or render"
services within the meaning of section 36, they can be approved by the court as part of a contract of employment.
Section 36 does not prescribe the terms of a contract to
perform or render services in the professions specified ii1 .
the section. It is obvious that a contract of a minor for em-""
ployment in such professions may reasonably contain many
provisions other than those specifying the services to be ren- "
dered and the compensation to be paid therefor. Thus, 8 ".
minor actor may incur obligations to travel, to participate in :\
instruction and training deemed necessary by the employer, ~
to refrain from immoral conduct, to attend publicity meetings j
or social gatherings arranged by the employer, and to cooperate in other respects with the employer in his endeavors to
attract the attention of the public to the employee. There was
no need for the Legislature to enact provisions with regard to
the C<Bdent of the contracts specified in section 36, for the
Legislature made each contract subject to judicial scrutiny to
insure that in the light of the reasonable interests of both
parties it adequately protect the interests of the minor.
[12) The provisions in section 36 regarding the submission
of contracts of minors for court approval are based on a policy
differ_ from "the policy of the law to discourage adultJl
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from contracting with infants" (Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal.
App. 158, 160-161 [285 P. 720]; Ji'littner v. EquitabZe Life
Assur. Soc., 30 Cal.App. 209 [157 P. 630]), which underlies
the right of minors to disaffirm their contracts. In professions
in which one frequently begins a career at a tender age, it is
to the interest of minors tbat they be able to make contracts
with employers reasonably protecting the interests of both
parties. To accomplish this purpose broad discretion has been
vested in the court to which such contracts are submitted. The
court may consider whether the terms of the contract are reasonable in the light of the then financial and educational interests of the minor as well as the proper development of his
talents and his chances for success in the profession. This discretion, which has been vested in the court to enable the parties
to adjust their contract relations to their needs, would be
rendered ineffectual to scrve the bests interests of the minor
if it were not 'applicable to such option provisions as in this
case.
An option to extend the term of employment is common to
contracts of employment in the professions specified in section 36. Court decisions relating to contracts of adult performers or players in professional sports evidence the use
of such option clauses. (Shubert Tlteatrical 00. v. Bath, 271 F.
827 [20 A.L.R. 486] ; Philadelphia Ball Olub v. Lajoie, 202 Pa.
210 [51 A. 973,90 Am.St.Rep. 627,58 L.R.A. 227].) In contracts of employment with minor actors option clauses are even
more im:portant, for frequently the employer is contracting
with persons of no tested ability or established reputation,
who may prove to have no appeal to the public. (Sec Penfield
v. Bennett Film Lab., 4 Cal.App.2d 306 [40 P.2d 587].) He
may reasonably object to committing himself to a long term
contract of employment or to making large initial investments
without securing the right to make use of the talents of the
employee in the future should they meet expectations and·
find public recognition. The expedient of granting one or
more options to the employer to extend the term of employment at an increasing rate of compensation encourages him
to develop unknown talent; without such an expedient few
employers would risk the costly sponsorship of such talent.
[13] Section 2855 of the Labor Code, which prohibits the enforcement of contracts for employment extending over a period of more than seven years, applies t.o the term of employment of minors under contracts specified in section 36 (Dc

\
\
\
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Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Ca1.App.2d 225
[153 P.2d 983]). There is thus a seven-year limit on the period
for which an actor can be boUltd by a contract of employment.
Given that limitation the court considers before approving a
contract under section 36 whether or not the intercsts of the
minor are best protected by a contract granting to the employer
the right to exercise one or more options to extend the term of ,
employment. If the court were precluded from approving
contracts with such option clauses, even though reasonable
persons would include them in their contracts,;the employers
deprived of the protection of such clauses woUld unquestionably offer contracts less favorable to the minors. Such an
interpretation of section 36 would violate the familiar rule of
statutory construction that statutes should be given a common
sense meaning that entails no unreasonable consequences.
(Dempsey v. Market Street Railway Co., 23Cal.2d 110, 113
[142 P.2d 929]; Aggeler v. Dominguez, 217 Cal. 429, 434
[19 P.2d 241] ; Kipp v. B~'llingham, 217 Cal. 527, 530 [20 P.2d
318]; Telegraph Avenue Corp. v. Raentsch, 205 Cal. 93, 97
[269 P. 1109, 61 A.L.R. 366] ; Cullerton v. Mead, 22 Cal. 95,
98; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Ca1.App.2d 346, 359 [77 P.2d
491] ; California Employment Stab. Com. v. Municipal Court,
62 Cal.App.2d 781, 785 [145 P.2d 361].)
Weare here concerned with section 36, as it read before
the 1947 amendment. In 1947, after the order approving
the contract between the parties had been entered the provisions of section 36 were amended by the Legislature.· The

I

." A. eontract, otherwise' valid, entered into during minorit)', eannot
be disafiirmed upon that ground either during the actual minorit)' of I
the person entering into BUell eontract, or at anT time thereafter, in the f
following eases:
"I. . . .
"2. A. eontract or agreement employing BUeb person u, or wherein '
neb person agrees to perform or render aerviees u, an actor, actress,
or other dramatic performer, or U a participant or player in profeslional 'Ports, including, but without being limited to, professional
boxers, professional wrestlers and professional joekeYl, where sueb eontract or agreement hu been approved by the superior court in the count)'
in whieb Inch minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be
given upon the petition of either party to the contract or agreement
after Inch reasonable notice to the other party thereto u may be fixed
by said eourt, with opportunity to BUeb other party to appear and be
heard; and said eourt shall have jurisdiction to approve, and ita
approval when given shall extend to the whole of said contract or
agreement, and of all the terms and provisions th&reof, including, but
without being limited to, any optional or eonditional pl'oYisions contained therein for extension, prolongation or termination of the term
thereof."
(State. 1947, ch. 526, § 1.)

.....
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intent of the Legislature was to leave no doubt as to the meaning of section 36, and in no wise to change it, for it declared:
"The amendment made by this act does not constitute a change
in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law." (Stats. 1947,
ch. 526, § 2.)
[14] It can hardly be questioned that there are reasonable
grounds for the statutory provisions withdrawing the right of
disaffirmance from minors with regard to contracts to render
services in the professions specified in section 36, if such contracts are found reasonable by a court in a special proceeding
for the examination thereof. Whether certain other groups of
minors engaged in professions similar to those specified in section 36 should be included in the section is a matter of legislative discretion. New legislation such as this ordinarily first
covers the fields where it is most urgently needed, and may be
extended in the light of experience. (PeopZev. Western Fruit
Growers,22 Cal.2d 494,506 [140 P.2d 13] ; Rainey v. Michel,
6 Ca1.2d 259, 270-273 [57 P.2d 932, 105 A.L.R. 148] ; Martin
v. Superior Oourt, 194 Cal. 93, 101 [227 P. 762]; Title ct
Document Restoration 00. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 323, 325326 [88 P. 356, 119 Am.St.Rep. 199, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 682]; I'll. r6
McKelvey, 19 Cal.App.2d 94, 96 [64 P.2d 1002] ; Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292, 296-298 [44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690];
i(eokee Ooke 00. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 [34 8. Ct. 856,
58 L.Ed. 1288] ; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 [27 8.Ot.
243, 51 L.Ed. 357) ; Oarmichael v. Southern Ooal & Ooke 00.,
301 U.S. 495, 509 [57 S.Ot. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R.
1327].) The statute therefore does not violate constitutional
rights of the defendant under the equal protection of laws
clause of the United States Constitution or under the provisions of the California Constitution against special legislation.
Defendants Nero Pictures Inc. and Nebenzal, relying on
Imperial Ice. 00. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 36 [112 P.2d 631],
contend that the complaint does not set forth facts sufficient to
state a cause of action against them on the ground that the
complaint merely alleges that they had knowledge of the obligations of defendant toward plaintiff and not that they induced defendant to breach these obligations. It is unnecessary
to determine whether the allegations in the complaint bring
plaintiff within the holding of that case, since plaintiff has
indicated its intent to amend its complaint as soon as opportunity arises to do so.
[15] Defendants contend that since it does not appear on
the face of the contract that the services promised by defend-
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ant Brodel were extraordinary services, plaintiff is not entitled
to an injunction under sections 2855 of the Labor Code and
526 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this appeal from a
judgment dismissing an action upon sustaining a general
demurrer, we are not concerned with the type of relief to
which plaintiff may be entitled. If plaintiff's allegations state
a cause of action and are supported by proof the court may
grant it any relief consistent with its cause of ~ction (Code
Civ. Proc., § 580).
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.

)

SHENK, J.-I dissent.
There can be no quarrel with the conclusion that section 36 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1927 (Stats. 1927,
p. 1917), is constitutional and withdraws the right of disaffirmance as to a judicially approved contract to perform
dramatic services entered into by a minor j but I cannot agree
with the conclusion that by the language of that section in
1927 the Legislature accomplished what it belatedly and
twenty years later (Stats. 1947, p. 1518) said it intended by
the earlier act.
Section 34 of the Civil Code permits a minor to make a
contract to perform personal· services (as limited by specified
laws not involved), subject to his power of disaffirmance under
other provisions. Section 35 confers the right of disaffirmance
by the minor either before his majority or within a reasonable
time afterwards, except as otherwise specified in section 36.
The pertinent language of the latter section as it read at the
time h~re involved is: "A minor can not disaffirm a contract,
otherwise valid, to perform or render services as actor, actress, or other dramatic services . . . where such contract has
been approved by thc superior court of the county where such
minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be given
on the petition of either party to the contract after such
--reasonable notice to the other party thereto as may be fixed
by said court, with opportunity to such other party to appear
and be heard."
Joan Brodel, when 17 years of age, executed a contract
whereby she agreed to perform dramatic services exclusively
for Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., as producer, "for and during
tile term of this agreement." The "term of this agreement"
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was specified to commence on the 30th day of March, 1942,
and to continue for a period of 52 weeks, at a salary of $600
per week. By the same instrument she granted to the producer six separate "rights or options to extend the term of
employment" for additional successive periods of 52 weeks
each at progressively higher weekly salaries. The contract,
after notice and hearing, was approved by the court. In due
time the producer elected to exercise the first, second and
third options, and the artist performed thereunder. On January 26, 1946, the artist arrived at her majority. On February 13, 1946, within the time stated in the contract, the
producer gave notice of its election to exercise the fourth
option. On February 20, 1946, the artist gave written notice
of disaffirmance and declined to render services pursuant to
any purported exercise of the fourth and further options.
The foregoing comprises the substance of the allegations
of the complaint. The order sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the action was based upon the trial court's determination that section 36 vested in the court the power
to approve only contracts to perform or render dramatic
services j' that since the grant of a right or option to extend
the term of the agreement was not such a contract, the right
of disaflirmance as to such right or option was not taken
away.
By section 36, as it read at the time here involved, the right
was withdrawn as to a minor's contract to perform or render
dramatic services, where "such contract" had been approved
by the superior court. "Such approval" might be given upon
petition, notice and hearing. The court's power was thus
expressly limited to approval of a minor's contract to perform
or render dramatic services. Approval of anything beyond
that was outside of or in excess of the authority vested in the
court. Since upon approval disaffirmance was prohibited
only as to contracts to perform dramatic services, approval
of anything further would accomplish nothing. It would
be purely gratuitous, and could not deprive the minor of the
right of disaffirmance otherwise conferred by law. Language
extending the expressed deprivation should not be judicially
supplied.
The specification of a contract to perform dramatic services
refers to an accepted offer, a present binding obligation to
perform those services. A valid option is not an accepted
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offer, but merely binds the optioner to keep open an offer. '
It is the sale of a present right to create a future obligation
to perform. (Hicks v. Christeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716, 718
[164 P. 395] ; Seeburg v. EZ Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1,
4 [128 P.2d 362]; Brickell v. Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd, 10
Cal.App.17,22 [101 P.16], citing Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law;
Cline v. HaZl, 107 Okla. 218 [232 P. 31, 33] ; Restatement of '
the Law of Contracts, § 47.) There is no obligation to perform
until the option is exercised, and conceivably the offer may
never ripen into an obligation to perform.
The plaintiff objected to this construction and application
of the language employed by the Legislature, but did not
question the fact that the words of the contract appeared to
limit the employment and the promise to perform dramatic
services to a term of one year from March 30, 1942. It argued
that the purpose of the enactment would be obviated unless
the several options to extend the term for the successive
periods be included within the present obligation to perform
dramatic services. To the possible answer that it could have
written a contract for a straight seven-year term the plaintiff '
replied that the executed contract had been the standard in
form for many years.
The plaintiff invoked the rule of contemporaneous construction. The construction asserted was not express but
tacit; that is, it was inferred from a consistent failure by
minor artists for about 20 years or since 1927 to attempt disaffirmance of judicially approved contracts, or 10 request
limited approval by the court, on the ground that disaffirmance
was not withdrawn as to the option features included within
a contract to perform dramatic services. This failure, however, may also be noted as evidence of satisfaction by the
minors with their contracts. But assuming that such failure
could create a contemporaneous construction, the rule is nevertheless inapplicable when the statute calls for a difIerent construction. (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, ante, pp. 66,
74 [187 P.2d 686], citing California Drive-In Resfauranf
,Ass'" v. CZark, 22 Ca1.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R.
1028].)
The plaintiff also relied on the act of 1947 (supra, Stats.
1947, p. 1518) which amended the language of section 36 re,garding the contract as to which the minor's right of disaffirmance was withdrawn upon approval by the court. That
section now contains the following relating to the contract
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and the authority of the COurt: I' A contract or agreement employing such person as, or wherein such person agrees to
perform or render services as, an actor, actress, or other dramatic performer, . . . where such contract or agreement has
been approved by the superior court . . . and said court shall
have jurisdiction to approve, and its approval when given
shall extend to the whole of said contract or agreement, and
all of the terms and provisions thereof, including, but without
being limited to, any option or conditional provisions contained therein for extension, prolongation or termination of
the term thereof." Section 2 of the 1947 act states that the
amendment does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory
of, the preexisting law.
Without such a legislative declaration a later amendment
may be taken as stating the intended meaning of a statute
before amendment. (De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
67 Cal.App.2d 225, 232-233 [153 P.2d 983].) The addition
of the legislative declaration is not a matter of judicial inquiry unless it has some weight in determining prior legislative meaning. It can have no weight where the declaration is
diametrically opposed to the fact. (California Emp. etc.
Com. v. Payne, ante, pp. 210, 213-214 [187 P.2d 702].)
Without that declaration the conclusion is irresistible that the
change in wording of section 36 was intended as a change in
meaning. In truth the later inclusion of matters not theretofore mentioned would be taken as a legislative admission that
at· the time of the prior statute they were either overlooked
or were not intended to be included. Inasmuch as the 1927
and 1947 amendments to section 36 provide the express exceptions to the exercise of the power of disaffirmance conferred
by section 35, the courts should confine the exceptions within
the bounds of the plain language employed by the Legislature.
It does not appear whether the claimed standard form of
contract for employment of actors in motion picture production was in use in 1927. If so, the Legislature by the amendment to section 36 in that year did not indicate awareness
thereof so as clearly to authorize approval of the entire contract. From the clear language of the 1947 amendment expressing such intent, it becomes obvious that the Legislature
was made aware of the facts at least since the commencement
of the present action. I see no justification for employing the
expedient of interpretation in accord with the 1947 legislative declaration to countenance a statutory deprivation of
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the defendant '8 right of disaffirmance of which she was not
thus clearly deprived under the applicable preexisting law;'
In such case the later amendment becomes a rule for the future only. (Matter of Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 209-210 [131 P ..
352] ; Clayton v. Schultz, 4 Ca1.2d 425, 430 [50 P.2d 446].) ~
In my opinion the trial court correctly ruled that the facts;
stated in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action, I
and I would affirm the jUdgment.
Carter, J., concurred.

,

Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 27,
]948. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

